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In search of feminist theory
What is feminist theory? This is the first of two issues I will address in my
reply. Two of the commentators offer analyses of feminist politics as if it
were feminist theory. A third offers a tour of male high theory. Where is
feminist theory in all of this? The second issue is that of a new convergence
over the issue of difference, in that we all agree that difference cannot be
analysed successfully without reference to overarching frameworks and to
overlaps, together with a rejection of the notion that social locations are
incommensurable.
Rita Felski suggests that story-telling is good for feminist politics – but
is that the same as saying that it is good for feminist theory? Felski makes
a powerful case for story-telling as one of the techniques of effective per-
suasion in politics. I am happy to agree that in politics rhetoric and presen-
tation of the message do matter and that we should pay attention to the
devices available. I am happy to agree that the rich repertoire of feminist
narratives in the public sphere has been a powerful part of feminist poli-
tics. Indeed I will concede that story-telling can travel across cultural
differences as well as reinforce commonalities. But I am reluctant to equate
feminist politics with feminist theory. I think it is more effective to mark
this separation, and to think in terms of alliances, than to blur the bound-
ary. At the end of her article, however, Felski seems to agree that politics
and theory are different, and certainly that science and literature are differ-
ent. Science and story-telling each have their place within feminism, and
they are separate. At this point we are in agreement. Feminist theory is not
advanced by story-telling.
Ann Phoenix likewise frames her argument in terms of feminist politics
rather than feminist theory. But her main concern is to contrast my rather
pessimistic assessment of the state of feminist theory with an optimistic
assessment in which the points for which I argue are already in play in
feminist theory. Phoenix does not reject my arguments, but rather names
other texts which have similar themes. I am happy to accept her gentle
reminders of allies in these matters and her support for the main thrust of
my argument.
Felski, like Phoenix, agrees that the question of difference is important
and agrees with the direction I take to seek its resolution – the power of
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argument. Felksi, like myself, notes the tendency in feminist theory to rely
on universals whilst being reluctant to admit that this reliance is actually
taking place.
The third commentator, Axeli Knapp, provides a review of male high
theory. Again, is this feminist theory? Habermas may be interesting, but I
did not write an article about him, nor Foucault, nor Marx, nor Mannheim.
Indeed, since the point of her excursion appears to be little more than
saying that the production of theory can be subject to social bias, the reason
for this long discussion is even less clear, since we do not disagree on this
point.
When it comes to feminist issues, Knapp appears to agree with me:
‘Walby rightly states that Haraway does not explicate and justify the ethic
and aesthetic norms that factually guide her writing’ (2000: 216) and
indeed that ‘she is right to note that “myth, fiction, ethics and aesthetics
are a very weak basis for feminist knowledge claims” ’ (2000: 216–17).
The real point of disagreement emerges when Knapp states that she
‘understand[s] feminism as a variant of critical theory. As such it belongs
to those traditions that have decisively interrogated empiricism and posi-
tivism’ (2000: 217). This is an exceptionally narrow conception of femin-
ism, excluding so many varieties of feminist theory. I don’t think feminism
‘belongs’ to any such narrow (largely male) tradition. Critical theory as a
school of thought is a tiny proportion of the breadth of thinking on which
feminism draws. My conception of feminist theory is much more wide-
ranging, and not confined to a sub-branch of a sub-branch of traditional
theory. Further, by such a statement Knapp dismisses out of hand empiri-
cally informed feminist analyses as entering into her category of ‘theory’.
It is Knapp’s commitment to critical theory which means that she does not
actually engage with the issue of evidence, merely asserting that philoso-
phers in her tradition have already dealt with it as an issue and dismissed
it. But such summary dismissal of the role of empirical evidence in theory
formation is not justified. No one claims that data is truth. But the collec-
tion and evaluation of evidence is a necessary step in theory building (as
Felski also agrees).
When addressing the practical issues I raised in my article, Knapp fails
to attend to the substantive issues raised, for instance, producing her own
typology of difference, rather than addressing the specific examples and
texts used in my article. Then, curiously, she recapitulates some of the main
argument of my sections, as if what she said was in rejection of my own.
For instance, on Fraser’s concept of ‘transformation’, she notes that its
meaning ‘strongly depends on the underlying political and theoretical
analysis’ – but that was the central point of my argument here. Does Knapp
agree with me, despite her best efforts, when we reach more substantive
matters?
Indeed there seems to be a common agreement among all of us, myself
and the three commentators, Felski, Phoenix and Knapp, that the time is
past when the issue of difference can be deployed in feminist theory in
such a way as to block analysis of commonalities as well. Perhaps what we
are seeing here is convergence, or hybridization, between previously
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different strands of feminist thinking. We all seem to agree that complex
interconnections are the heart of the matter, that difference and universal-
ism, and recognition, equality and transformation, are not necessarily
incompatible in feminist theory. We cannot write of difference without
reference to the wider framework on which we draw to situate those differ-
ences. We cannot write of women without reference to differences as well
as commonalities. We seem to have reached a new common position that
analyses of difference need to be situated within arguments about over-
arching frameworks.
Phoenix asks me to spell out what I mean by scientific method. I mean
the testing of knowledge claims against evidence and other theories. All
knowledge claims are fallible, of course. I think debates in feminist theory
are sometimes under-supported by evidence. Debates on questions of
‘what works’ to change things would be improved if we had more evi-
dence, in particular if we had more reliably comparative evidence. Theory
which draws only on other theory is beginning to take a disproportionate
amount of the resources of the women’s studies community. Data collec-
tion is an indispensable part of the long chain of interrelated efforts to test
and improve theories – it is not sufficient, but it is necessary. In short, I
think feminist theorists, including Knapp, should not sneer at data
collection.
Perhaps one of the difficulties we have is not only the divide between
politics and theory, but also that between different disciplines. Feminist
theory is rightly ambitious in seeking to transcend the boundaries of tra-
ditional academic disciplines. But sometimes the methodological prac-
tices, and shorthand for reporting on these, do not travel well between
those accustomed to the practices of different disciplines. Currently femin-
ist theory is dominated by those drawn from philosophical and literary
disciplines. For instance, the advisory board of Feminist Theory is drawn
disproportionately from these disciplines at the expense of those from
numerate disciplines, such as economics and geography. Within the liter-
ary disciplines the nature of the typical object of analysis, written text, and
the practices of its collection, sifting and analysis are often different from
those social science disciplines where the object of analysis may not take
the form of a written text, but instead involve statistics. Yet analysis of data,
whether it be text or statistics, is a key element in all disciplines. It would
be a pity if the methodological shorthand of the literary disciplines were
to dominate feminist theory. To reiterate, feminist theory is not a sub-
branch of critical theory, but much more wide-ranging, including the full
range of at least the human sciences.
So what is feminist theory? I think feminist theory is an attempt to
explain the nature and complexities of gender inequality. I don’t think it
should be a euphemism for philosophy. Feminists should continue
unashamedly to do science despite what some feminist philosophers say.
Of course, science is not perfect – it is fallible by its nature. But it is better
than fiction, better than story-telling, and better than aesthetics at produc-
ing knowledge. These may well be very effective and important forms of
persuasion within politics. But politics is not the same as theory.
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